“In war, truth is the first casualty” is perhaps one of the best known aphorisms about armed conflict. Information operations have long been conducted to influence or mislead military adversaries or civilian populations during war. However, the instantaneous transmission of information from any distance – through social media platforms and messaging apps – has changed the scale, speed, and reach of information operations. Today, generative artificial intelligence provides seemingly infinite possibilities to create misleading or dangerous content. In light of these developments, states , humanitarians and human rights advocates have voiced concern that spreading harmful information risks inciting violence, causing distress, increasing vulnerabilities, denying access to essential services, and may also undermine or disrupt humanitarian operations. Worryingly, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Expression has found that in today’s armed conflicts, disinformation and hate speech are “increasing[ly] focus[ed] on civilian populations rather than military personnel”. In light of this reality, we must recall that there is a red line between an information operation that complies with international humanitarian law and one that violates it. In this post, ICRC Legal Advisers Tilman Rodenhäuser and Samit D’Cunha explain some of the legal boundaries of information operations under international humanitarian law (IHL) through four examples. Limits on information operations under public international law as applicable outside armed conflict, or under human rights law during armed conflict, are not examined in this post. |