Introduction
On January 1, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) put into effect new revisions to its National Defense Law (henceforth, “Law”) (?????????? zhonghua renmin gonghe guo guofang fa) (Xinhua, December 26, 2020; South China Morning Post, January 3).[1] This is the first update since 2009. Although the revisions might seem ordinary at first glance, they have important implications for the future of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which—it is worth noting—answers to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), not the state. There has been tension throughout the PRC’s history surrounding the subordination of the armed forces relative to the Party, the state and indeed the paramount leader.[2] The new defense law reinforces the preeminence in this relationship of Xi Jinping (???), who is already chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and commander-in-chief of the CMC Joint Operations Command Center, as well as CCP General Secretary and president of the Chinese state.
This revision can be summarized with three main points: 1) It symbolically brings the law into line with Xi’s program; 2) it further consolidates defense mobilization and Party discipline powers under Xi and 3) it sends a message of Xi’s resolve and power, both within China and to the world. This consolidation of power reflects a fear of losing control. Overall, the Law is another step in Xi’s program of maximalism (The Diplomat, January 30, 2019), putting on a bold front that suggests a struggle against counter currents both abroad and at home.
Explicitly inserting the language of “Xi Thought,” including Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era (???????????????? xi jinping xin shidai zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi sixiang) and Xi Jinping’s Thought on Military Strengthening and Comprehensive National Security Thought, among others, brings the Law into ideological alignment with the nation’s paramount leader.[3] This is most apparent in article 1, which states:
“In order to build and consolidate national defense, ensure the smooth progress of Reform and Opening and Socialist Modernization, and realize the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation, this law is established in accordance with the Constitution.” (additions italicized)
The “Chinese nation” (????, Zhonghua Minzu) refers to the PRC as a national, multi-ethnic state. There is, however, a second definition of minzu, namely “ethnicity” or “race.” In addition to citizenship, Zhonghua can also refer a more essentialist notion of Chinese ethnicity.[4] In recent years, Beijing has expanded its claims over people identified as “Chinese” to an extraordinary degree: detaining minors with American citizenship in Hong Kong (South China Morning Post, September 16, 2019); preventing ethnic Chinese business people with Australian citizenship from leaving the country in Shanghai (Sydney Morning Herald, January 24, 2019) and implementing new visa policies which explicitly differentiate foreigners with ethnic Chinese heritage (Straits Times, February 1, 2018). A degree of chauvinism runs throughout these cases such that we might even term the program the great rejuvenation of the Chinese race.
This “Great Rejuvenation” is Xi’s overarching program to revitalize China as a modern economic and military superpower, under which his myriad other policies fall. With the elevation of Xi Thought to China’s national constitution, where it sits co-equal to the reform and modernization programs of former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (???), Xi has cemented his place in the pantheon of Communist Chinese leaders as a new Mao Zedong (???) (China Brief, September 21, 2017).
Consolidating Real Power
Under the auspices of “national defense and military reform,” the Law grants greater authority to the CMC for “national defense mobilization.” This marks a key practical change, removing an earlier provision that “the State Council and the Central Military Commission jointly lead the preparation and implementation of mobilization.” Instead, article 50 now reads:
“Leading agencies for national defense mobilization, central government agencies and relevant departments of the Central Military Commission shall organize the preparation and implementation of national defense mobilization in accordance with the division of responsibilities.”
This may look like a small change, but dropping the State Council from its leading role in defense mobilization and putting defense agencies first (including the CMC National Defense Mobilization Department and provincial military districts) makes the intent clear. Although Premier Li Keqiang (???) retains his position as chairman of the State National Defense Mobilization Commission, the change unequivocally elevates the power of the CMC at the expense of the State Council.
Zeng Zhiping, a military law expert at Soochow University, explains: “The CMC is now formally in charge of making national defense policy and principles, while the State Council becomes a mere implementing agency to provide support to the military” (South China Morning Post, January 3). Since the 2016 military reorganization and breakup of the General Departments, no member of the CMC has anything like Xi’s stature. Thus, the Law’s revisions further consolidate and legalize his direct control over the military.
National defense mobilization refers broadly to converting civilian assets for military use. This has previously included the mobilization of armed forces, economic, science and technology, transportation, air defense and/or political entities (Sina, July 25, 2002). A 2018 article in China Defense News (?????, zhongguo guofang bao) lays out five distinct priorities: 1) serving the comprehensive national security strategy, 2) protecting the “theater command” strategy, 3) executing emergency rescue and disaster relief, 4) providing for rights protection and stability maintenance (???? weiquan weiwen) and 5) developing the strategy of military-civil fusion (???? junmin ronghe, MCF) (Renminwang, October 18, 2018).
A recent report by the Center for a New American Security suggests that Beijing wishes to harness the dynamism outside of state-owned enterprises to accelerate military development through MCF, but still faces significant obstacles.[5] In line with this analysis, article 38 of the Law calls for greater market orientation in defense acquisitions through “emphasizing the role of market mechanisms to promote fair competition in defense scientific research/production and military procurement.” An “Explanation” of the Law on the website of the National People’s Congress dated October 13 additionally highlights the “law of value” and “joint development and sharing of military and local resources.”[6] Considering Xi’s overall posture toward the market economy, any deepening of the private sector’s role in developing the military is likely to be offset by ongoing efforts to centralize the party’s control over the economy (China Brief: September 28, 2020; December 6, 2020).
Chairman Responsibility System
Strengthening Party discipline is another key facet of the revisions. Specifically, the Law strengthens the CMC’s Chairman Responsibility System (CRS) (???????, junwei zhuxi fuze zhi) (see article 16 of the Law). First promulgated in the 1982 PRC Constitution, the term was revitalized in 2014 and further enhanced during the 2017 19th Party Congress (China Leadership Monitor, January 23, 2018). The CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) lists three purposes for CRS: 1) ensure the Party’s effective control of the People’s Armed Forces, 2) continue the Party’s tradition of organizing and controlling the military and 3) govern the military by law.[7] According to the PLA Daily: “the [CMC] Chairman must maintain unified leadership and command of the national armed forces; all major issues of defense and military organization must be decided by the Chairman; and all CMC work must fall under the management and responsibility of the Chairman” (PLA Daily, January 28, 2015).
The Party’s 2017 motto of the “Three Protects” (???? san ge weihu) re-emphasized: “Protect the authority of the Party Center, protect the Core, and protect and carry out the Chairman Responsibility System.”[8] The new Law reflects this cross-cutting of Party and government by adding the admonition to be “faithful to the Party” (see article 59): “Active duty military personnel must be faithful to the country, faithful to the Party, carry out their responsibilities, fight bravely, not fear sacrificing their lives, and protect the security, honor, and interests of the country” (addition italicized). The 2009 law simply stated that “the armed forces of the PRC are subordinate to the people” (see article 19 of the 2009 law). As Mao said, “political power flows from the barrel of a gun.”[9] Strengthening the CRS increases Xi’s direct control over the CMC and the PLA via the mechanism of the Party.
Read more at https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-updated-national-defense-law-going-for-broke/
