The Islamic Republic of Iran has materially enabled and industrialized Russia’s drone campaign against Ukrainian civilians since mid-2022 through the supply, modification, and joint production of Shahed-style drones. This was not an isolated arms transfer, but a sustained contribution to Russia’s capacity to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity at scale. Indeed, the assistance culminated in Iranian officials and entities providing drone designs, training, and technology to Russia — handing over the information Russia needed to begin domestic production and ramping up its air terror campaign against Ukraine.
By late 2025, the Iranian government’s assistance to Russia’s drone war underpinned the most severe escalation of Russia’s aerial attacks, resulting in record civilian casualties, incursions by Russian drones into NATO airspace, and the gravest energy crisis Ukraine has faced since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022.
While Ukrainians continue facing relentless drone attacks, the Russian-Iranian Shahed industry poses a much broader threat. In apparent retaliation for the U.S. and Israeli war on Iran in recent weeks, Iranian drones, reportedly including Russian-produced variants, have targeted its neighboring countries in the Middle East, damaging civilian structures such as residential buildings, hotels, and airports. Previously, the Iranian government reportedly provided attack drones to repressive regimes and armed groups across Africa and the Middle East, including forces backing the then-government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the Sudanese Armed Forces, armed groups such as the Houthis in Yemen, and others.
A forthcoming report based on months of analysis by the Atlantic Council Strategic Litigation Project (where one of us, Celeste, works), the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR, where Anastasiya works), and the research organization C4ADS argues that Russian Shahed attacks meet the legal tests for the war crimes of attacking civilians, civilian objects, and specially protected objects, and the crimes against humanity of murder and other inhumane acts (pp. 49-61). Secondary liability, furthermore, extends in certain instances to Iranian officials involved in industrial, financial, and logistical support for atrocities.
The continued impunity of Iranian officials reveals a structural failure of international criminal and sanctions enforcement to holistically constrain major international threat actors. The international community must use and strengthen all tools of law and diplomacy at its disposal — including international criminal law — to comprehensively thwart enablers of atrocities and hold them accountable.
Building Russia’s Capacity to Attack Ukraine at Scale
The role of Iran (for the purposes of this article, “Iran” refers to the current regime, as distinct from Iran as a nation) in Russia’s drone war against Ukraine was not incidental, improvised, or limited to arms transfers at the margins. From mid-2022 onward, the Iranian regime enabled Russia to overcome a critical operational bottleneck: its inability to conduct sustained long-range aerial attacks deep into Ukrainian territory using low-cost, expendable systems. Through the provision, adaptation, and ultimately the co-production of Shahed-style drones, along with operator training, Iran transformed Russia’s sporadic strike capacity into an industrialized campaign of aerial terror against Ukraine and arguably beyond.
The partnership began with direct transfers of Iranian-made drones. From August 2022, Iran supplied Russia with Mohajer-6 reconnaissance drones and Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 kamikaze drones (also commonly referred to as loitering munitions or unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs), along with operator training and technical support. These systems filled an acute gap in Russia’s arsenal. Facing sanctions-induced shortages of critical components for precision-guided munitions, Russia lacked a scalable means of striking civilian infrastructure far from the front line. Shahed drones — cheap, long-range, and easily replenished — offered precisely that capability. Within weeks of their first deployment by Russia in September 2022, they were used to strike Ukrainian civilian homes, energy facilities, and entire residential areas well beyond active combat zones (see here, here, and here).
The Iranian government’s involvement did not stop at delivery. As early deployments exposed technical failures and operator errors, Iranian personnel reportedly provided on-the-ground troubleshooting and training, including in occupied Crimea. This operational support ensured that the drones could be used effectively in large numbers and integrated into Russia’s evolving strike tactics. By mid-fall 2022, Shaheds had become indispensable to Russia’s ability to conduct nightly terror attacks on civilian targets.
The most consequential escalation came with the decision to localize production. In November 2022, a front company for the Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), Sahara Thunder, concluded a major agreement with Russia’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan. This marked a clear shift from episodic supply to sustained industrial cooperation. Under the deal, Iran transferred not only drone kits, but also blueprints, source code, production equipment, and extensive training hours, enabling Russia to manufacture Shahed-style drones domestically at scale. The agreement envisaged thousands of units annually and laid the foundation for continuous design modifications and output expansion.
Crucially for the criminal liability of Iranian officials, this cooperation deepened after the consequences of the Shahed attacks became undeniable. By late 2022, Russian Shahed strikes had already been widely reported as tools of mass civilian harm and as central drivers of Ukraine’s first major winter energy crisis. Despite international condemnation and mounting evidence of unlawful use, Iran continued deliveries, technical upgrades, and production support. By 2024–2025, the Alabuga facility had expanded dramatically, and Russian production reached an estimated 2,700 Shahed drones per month — enabling sustained, high-volume attacks that overwhelmed Ukraine’s air defenses through sheer scale. The effects were foreseeable: according to data collected by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the weekly average for Shahed-style drones launched at Ukraine from February 2022 until September 2024 was 75. From September 2024 through February 2026, that average jumped to 903. In turn, the weekly rate of drones that evaded interception in 2025 was nearly three times that of 2024.
Weapon of Atrocities in Ukraine, New Threat to NATO
This industrialization, enabled by Iran’s support, changed the character of Russia’s air war on Ukraine. The niche filled by Shahed drones — inexpensive but with a range to hit targets beyond the front lines — was precisely what Russia needed to target civilians. By design, Ukraine’s immediate military targets are generally otherwise accessible on the front lines. Shahed drones, therefore, became the backbone of Russia’s daily swarm attacks, “double-tap” strikes, and combination attacks (alongside high-cost missiles) to exhaust defenses, maximize harm, and terrorize civilian populations.
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Iranian Officials’ Legal Liability in Russia’s Drone War on Ukraine
